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RCRA’S NEW CAUSATION QUESTION: 
LINKING UBIQUITOUS WASTES TO 
SPECIFIC DEFENDANTS 
Michael Somers* 
Abstract: The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) imposes 
liability on defendants whose handling of solid waste may present an im-
minent and substantial danger to the environment. For most of RCRA’s 
history, there was no need to prove a link between waste that was harming 
the environment and the waste handled by the defendant, because the 
highly specific materials litigated under RCRA only could have come from 
the defendant. However, now that plaintiffs have sued defendants over the 
handling of naturally occurring wastes, courts must decide what level of 
proof is required to demonstrate the link between the defendant’s waste 
and the waste causing the harm. This Note argues that courts should use 
the same low standard of proof of causation that applies throughout the 
rest of the statute. 
Introduction 
 When Americans think about the problem of waste disposal, their 
heads immediately fill with images of nuclear waste, overflowing land-
fills, and the sights and smells that accompany traditional forms of 
“waste.” However, while waste indeed includes such traditional notions 
of hazardous waste or garbage, it can refer to any material discarded by 
humans and put back into the environment.1 When waste is considered 
in such terms, even naturally occurring bacteria or minerals, such as 
ammonia and nitrate, can be considered waste if discarded by humans 
back into the environment.2 
 Naturally occurring and common wastes, in addition to more dan-
gerous types of waste, are regulated by the United States’ federally run, 
and extremely comprehensive, waste management programs.3 While 
                                                                                                                      
* Executive Editor, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 2010–11. 
1 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27) (2006). RCRA 
defines “solid waste” as “discarded material . . . from industrial, commercial, mining, and 
agricultural operations, and community activities.” 
2 See id; Complaint at 4–6, United States v. Seaboard Foods LP, No. 06cv00989 (W.D. 
Okla. Sept. 14, 2006), 2006 WL 3098823. 
3 See, e.g., Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2692 (2006); RCRA, 
42 U.S.C. §§ 6917–6991; Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Li-
ability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2006). 
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natural wastes receive relatively little attention due to the comparatively 
high-profile nature of hazardous waste, their regulation is an important 
part of proper waste management.4 The Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act (RCRA) plays a large role in the regulation of non-
hazardous solid wastes, and is one of the few federal statutes that regu-
lates naturally occurring wastes.5 This regulation is done in part 
through one of RCRA’s citizen suit provisions, which allows citizens to 
sue a party whose waste management practices may pose an imminent 
and substantial endangerment to the environment or human health.6 
 Citizen suits under RCRA often boil down to questions of causa-
tion, and problems of proof.7 Did the defendant contribute to the waste 
in question? Can the waste in question pose a threat to the environ-
ment? Is the waste posing a threat in this case? How dangerous must 
the threat be? How imminent must the danger be? What kinds of proof 
may be introduced to prove these factors? While decades of case law 
have somewhat settled these issues,8 a new question is starting to 
emerge in the context of naturally occurring wastes. Is the harmful 
waste actually the same waste produced by the defendant, or has this 
naturally occurring waste come from a different man-made source, or 
even from the environment itself?9 Plaintiffs litigating these cases often 
do not have the scientific proof necessary to answer this question with 
certainty.10 Thus, courts that have heard the issue seem to reject these 
RCRA claims due to a lack of causation, and specifically a lack of scien-
tific evidence to prove this causation question.11 
 This Note will examine the level of causation that RCRA requires 
plaintiffs to demonstrate when linking a common and ubiquitous waste 
to a specific defendant, and specifically what types of scientific proof 
are permissible to establish this evidence. Part I will introduce the 
reader to the topic of solid waste regulation by offering a brief history 
                                                                                                                      
4 See John C. Chambers & Mary S. McCullough, From the Cradle to the Grave: An Histori-
cal Perspective of RCRA, 10 Nat. Resources & Env’t., Fall 1995, at 21, 22; Lori Gilmore, 
Comment, The Export of Nonhazardous Waste, 19 Envtl. L. 879, 883 (1989). 
5 See RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27); cf. TSCA, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2692 (regulating only 
toxic materials); CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (regulating only cleanup of hazardous 
waste sites). 
6 RCRA, § 7002, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B). 
7 See, e.g., Att’y Gen. of Okla. v. Tyson Foods Inc., 565 F.3d 769, 777 (10th Cir. 2009); 
Interfaith Cmty. Org. v. Honeywell Int’l, 399 F.3d 248, 261 (3d Cir. 2005); Cox v. City of 
Dallas, 256 F.3d 281, 297 (5th Cir. 2001). 
8 See Interfaith, 399 F.3d at 259–60; Cox, 256 F.3d at 295. 
9 See Tyson Foods, 565 F.3d at 777. 
10 See id. 
11 See id.; Steilacoom Lake Improvement Club Inc. v. Washington, 138 F. App’x 929, 
933 (9th Cir. 2005). 
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of the federal waste management statutes that lead to RCRA’s citizen 
suit provision.12 Part II will demonstrate that Congress intentionally au-
thored this citizen suit provision to lower causation requirements from 
those of the common law and to ensure greater protection to the envi-
ronment in the face of scientific uncertainty.13 Part III will show that 
courts have interpreted the language of the citizen suit provision very 
broadly based on the legislative history, making it easier for plaintiffs to 
demonstrate causation.14 Part IV will introduce the case of Oklahoma v. 
Tyson Foods, Inc., which provides a helpful illustration of the new causa-
tion question, and also demonstrates the incorrect way to address the 
question.15 Finally, Part V will argue that this new causation question 
should benefit from the same relaxed standard of causation that inten-
tionally appears in the rest of the statute.16 
I. A History of Solid Waste Regulation in the United States 
A. The Road to RCRA’s Most Important Citizen Suit 
 For much of the twentieth century, neither the United States gov-
ernment nor the American public was very concerned with the prob-
lem of waste disposal, despite the rapid increase in the amount of waste 
produced in the United States since the Industrial Revolution.17 Until 
1965, the entire extent of solid waste regulation was under the Public 
Health Service Act (PHSA), which emphasized research into better 
ways to dispose of waste.18 In the 1960s, however, environmental issues 
became a larger part of congressional discussion as lawmakers looked 
for ways to clean up America’s air, water, and land.19 This decade 
marked the first time that the United States began to think seriously 
about reshaping the way we regulate and dispose of waste.20 
                                                                                                                      
12 See infra Part I. 
13 See infra Part II. 
14 See infra Part III. 
15 See infra Part IV. 
16 See infra Part V. 
17 See Newsday, Rush to Burn: Solving America’s Garbage Crisis? 28–29 (1989); 
Chambers & McCullough, supra note 4, at 21. In the middle of the twentieth century, waste 
was generally defined as “a great variety of things that individuals, manufacturers, com-
mercial establishments, and communities discard as no longer usable, such as garbage, 
rubbish, ashes, street refuse . . . and the wastes from slaughterhouses, canneries, manufac-
turing plants, and hospitals.” H.R. Rep. No. 89–899, at 7 (1965). 
18 See Chambers & McCullough, supra note 4, at 21. 
19 Id. 
20 See id. 
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 In 1965, President Lyndon Johnson urged Congress to act with 
respect to solid waste regulation.21 After Congress investigated the dan-
gers behind improper waste disposal, it did not sugarcoat the situation 
for the American public.22 The Committee on Interstate and Foreign 
Commerce declared: “[W]aste collection and disposal activities create 
one of the most serious and most neglected aspects of environmental 
contamination affecting public health. . . . The efforts now being made 
to deal with this problem are clearly inadequate.”23 Congress re-
sponded to these findings, in part, by passing the Solid Waste Disposal 
Act (SWDA) of 1965.24 Like the PHSA, the SWDA focused on research 
goals and financial assistance to states, without any truly enforceable 
regulatory mechanism.25 
 During the 1970s, Congress and the American public became in-
creasingly concerned over a specific type of non-residential solid waste, 
namely hazardous waste.26 Again, Congress was forthright about the 
extent of the problem: “[A]pproximately 30–35 million tons of hazard-
ous waste are literally dumped on the ground each year . . . [which] can 
blind, cripple or kill . . . defoliate the environment, contaminate drink-
ing water supplies and enter the food chain under preset [sic], largely 
unregulated disposal practices.”27 With greater public attention in this 
decade to hazardous waste, Congress responded with the passage of the 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), which amended the 
SWDA.28 RCRA was intended to regulate the treatment, storage, and 
disposal of both solid and hazardous waste.29 RCRA is often described 
as regulating waste “from cradle to grave” because it has provisions for 
the generation of waste through its eventual disposal.30 Many heralded 
this statute as closing the last remaining loophole in environmental 
                                                                                                                      
21 Id. 
22 See H.R. Rep. No. 89–889, at 7. 
23 Id. 
24 See Solid Waste Disposal Act, Pub. L. No. 89–272, 79 Stat. 992 (codified as amended 
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992k (2006)). 
25 See Barry Needleman, Hazardous Waste Recycling Under the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act: Problems and Potential Solutions, 24 Envtl. L. 971, 974 (1994). 
26 See Chambers & McCullough, supra note 4, at 22–23. EPA regulations define hazard-
ous wastes in a complex manner, but generally consider the following four characteristics: 
ignitability, corrosivity, reactivity, and toxicity. See 40 C.F.R. § 261.20–.24 (2009). 
27 H.R. Rep. No. 94–1491, at 11 (1976). 
28 See RCRA, Pub. L. 94–580, 90 Stat. 2759 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–
6992k (2006)) (amending Solid Waste Disposal Act, which is now commonly called RCRA). 
29 RCRA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992k; see Gilmore, supra note 4, at 883. 
30 See Daniel Riesel, Private Party Litigation Under RCRA, in Envtl. L. 229, 231 (A.L.I.-
A.B.A. Course of Study, Feb. 4–6, 2009) available at Westlaw, SP036 ALI-ABA 229. 
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regulation as it applies to many harmful substances not covered by oth-
er environmental protection measures.31 
 Over the next several years, this “last remaining loophole” proved 
especially difficult to close because the regulation of solid waste, as op-
posed to hazardous waste, received little attention due to the high fears 
surrounding hazardous waste.32 Two years after the passage of RCRA, 
EPA had promulgated only a few regulations for the non-hazardous 
solid waste program.33 After several high-profile hazardous waste disas-
ters, the non-hazardous waste program became little more than a back-
ground concern.34 Abandoned hazardous waste sites, such as Love Ca-
nal in Niagara Falls, brought the dangers of hazardous waste to the 
forefront of public attention and highlighted the need for a statute 
even stronger than RCRA.35 
 The congressional response came with the passage of the Solid 
Waste Disposal Act Amendments of 1980, which focused on minimizing 
the danger of on-going hazardous waste sites.36 However, EPA fell sub-
ject to the same problems as in the late 1970s—consistently missing 
deadlines, and failing to promulgate regulations for the proper disposal 
of solid waste.37 Impatient with EPA’s delays, Congress returned to the 
waste disposal issue with the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments 
(HSWA) of 1984.38 Although Congress and the American Public were 
still primarily concerned with the regulation of hazardous waste,39 the 
HSWA also included provisions for the regulation of solid waste.40 Spe-
cifically, the HSWA added a citizen suit provision, which allowed citi-
                                                                                                                      
31 United States v. Waste Indus., Inc., 734 F.2d 159, 165 (4th Cir. 1984). 
32 See Chambers & McCullough, supra note 4, at 22. 
33 Id. 
34 See Gilmore, supra note 4, at 883; Eric R. Pogue, The Catastrophe Model of Risk Regula-
tion and the Regulatory Legacy of Three Mile Island and Love Canal, 15 Penn St. Envtl. L. Rev. 
463, 466 (2007). 
35 See Chambers & McCullough, supra note 4, at 22–23. In the Love Canal neighbor-
hood of Niagara Falls, New York, the local school board purchased a piece of land from a 
chemical company. In 1978, years after developing a residential neighborhood on the 
land, known carcinogens were found in the basements and yards of the community. See 
Pogue, supra note 34, at 466. 
36 See Pub. L. No. 96–482, 94 Stat. 2334 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992k 
(2006)); Chambers & McCullough, supra note 4, at 23. In order to address abandoned haz-
ardous waste sites, Congress also passed CERCLA, commonly known as the “Superfund Act.” 
See CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2006); Chambers & McCullough, supra note 4, at 23. 
37 See Chambers & McCullough, supra note 4, at 22–23. 
38 See P.L. 98–616, 98 Stat. 3221, (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992k 
(2006)); Chambers & McCullough, supra note 4, at 23. 
39 See Gilmore, supra note 4, at 883. 
40 See RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) (giving citizens the right to sue when solid waste 
may be presenting a danger to the environment). 
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zens to act as the EPA Administrator in enforcing proper solid waste 
disposal.41 
B. The Basic Elements of RCRA’s Citizen Suit Provision 
 Even though RCRA already specified how, when, and where to dis-
pose of many different wastes, Congress specifically intended to give cit-
izens broad authority to avoid future disasters not contemplated42 in 
other parts of the statute.43 The most important citizen suit44 provision 
of RCRA, enacted in section 7002 under the 1984 amendments to 
RCRA, enables citizens bring a law suit to court in order to prevent 
harm to human health or the environment.45 This citizen suit provision 
contains the exact language of a pre-existing RCRA provision, which 
allowed the Administrator of the EPA to commence lawsuits against 
waste-producing defendants who might present harm to the environ-
ment.46 Initially, EPA used this power frequently, filing more than fifty 
actions between 1979 and 1981.47 Despite EPA’s active prosecution of 
many actions under this section, the agency failed to correct all the in-
stances of improper waste disposal.48 The amendment to section 7002 
                                                                                                                      
41 Id. Technically, this citizen suit provision can be found in the Hazardous and Solid 
Waste Amendment of 1984, which was an amendment to the Solid Waste Disposal Act. 
However, any provision falling under the HSWA, SWDA, or RCRA is commonly referred to 
as RCRA. See Chambers & McCullough, supra note 4, at 22–23. 
42 Congress was also concerned that problems would be contemplated but still not en-
forced by the EPA. See Jonathan M. Peterson, Note, RCRA Enforcement Provisions After the 
1984 Amendments, 5 Va. J. Nat. Resources L. 323, 349 (1985). 
43 See Kathryn Saenz Duke, Using RCRA’s Imminent Hazard Provision in Hazardous Waste 
Emergencies, 9 Ecology L.Q. 599, 602 (1981). 
44 Citizens may also sue the Administrator of the EPA for failing to enforce non-
discretionary duties under the statute, often relating to permitting schemes or labeling 
requirements. See RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(A). 
45 See RCRA, § 7002, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B); Duke, supra note 43, at 602. 
46 See RCRA, § 7003, 42 U.S.C. § 6973(a). Several procedural differences exist between 
suits brought by the EPA and those brought by citizens. See Peterson, supra note 42, at 349. 
First, for citizen suits, there is a ninety-day notice requirement. Id. Also, if the EPA has 
commenced or is “diligently prosecuting” its own RCRA suit, a CERCLA section 106 ac-
tion, or a CERCLA response action, the citizen suit is barred. See id. Furthermore, many 
citizen suits are prevented from the outset because private citizens often do not have the 
resources available to initiate a complex cause of action. See id. Despite these differences, 
due to the identical language of these two sections regarding liability, this Note will alter-
nate between analyzing section 7002 cases and section 7003 cases. For the purpose of con-
struing a causation standard, judicial interpretations of section 7003 will be given as much 
weight as those interpreting section 7002. See Cox v. City of Dallas, 256 F.3d 281, 294 n.22 
(5th Cir. 2001). 
47 See Duke, supra note 43, at 601. 
48 See Cynthia L. Koehler, 1984 RCRA Amendments: Expanding Citizens’ Right to Sue, 65 
Or. L. Rev. 659, 669 (1986). 
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extended this ability to citizens, giving individuals the right to assist EPA 
as citizen-enforcers.49 
 Specifically, section 7002 states that a citizen may sue “any person50 
. . . who has contributed or who is contributing to the past or present 
handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of any solid or 
hazardous waste which may present an imminent and substantial en-
dangerment to health or the environment.”51 Essentially, there are four 
elements that plaintiffs must prove: (1) the defendants “contributed to” 
handling of a waste; (2) such waste “may present” an “endangerment”; 
(3) the endangerment must be “substantial”; and (4) the endangerment 
must be “imminent.”52 
II. Section 7002 Relaxes Common Law Causation Standards 
A. Section 7002’s Causation Requirements Are More Favorable  
to Environmental Plaintiffs Than Traditional  
Common Law Standards 
 As the above quoted language shows, Congress intended not only 
to give citizens a tool for enforcement, but also to lower strict notions of 
causation under the common law which prevented worthwhile envi-
ronmental tort suits from moving forward.53 One way the common law 
limits defendant liability is through the doctrine of proximate cause, 
which restricts the sphere of actors that may be held liable to those with 
a direct role in the harm.54 To illustrate, an automobile repairman who 
flooded a plaintiff’s gas tank, thereby causing an explosion when a cus-
tomer threw a match on the floor, was held not to be the proximate 
cause of the damage because his action did not have a direct enough 
                                                                                                                      
49 See RCRA, § 7002, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B). 
50 A “person” has been interpreted through case law to include individual persons, 
owners of companies, and even cities. See Cox, 256 F.3d at 293. 
51 Defendants may be liable for improperly storing, treating, disposing, or transporting 
solid waste. However, for purposes of this Note, all defendant actions concerning solid waste 
will be referred to generally as “handling.” See RCRA, § 7002, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B). 
52 Id. 
53 See S. Rep. No. 98–284, at 59 (1983). Some early cases under section 7003 held that 
the language of the statue simply laid out the threshold requirements of when the Admin-
istrator may seek an action in courts, but did not change substantive standards of liability. 
See United States v. Midwest Solvent Recovery, Inc., 484 F. Supp. 138, 144 (N.D. Ind. 1980). 
However, the congressional history of section 7002, discussed below, demonstrates Con-
gress’s desire to correct these early decisions and show courts that section 7002 actually 
changes substantive standards of liability, especially with regard to proximate cause. See S. 
Rep. No. 98–284, at 59; Solid and Hazardous Waste Committee, 16 Nat. Resources Law. 
309, 310 (1983–1984). 
54 See, e.g., Palmetto Fire Ins. Co. v. Clark Garage Co., 6 La. App. 420, 420 (La. Ct. App. 
1927) (demonstrating the doctrine of proximate cause). 
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bearing on the eventual outcome.55 According to the court, only the 
negligent match thrower was the proximate cause of the damage.56 Sec-
tion 7002 modifies standard notions of causation to be more favorable 
to plaintiffs in the solid waste context. 
 Section 7002 requires plaintiffs to prove four separate causation 
elements with lower proximate cause requirements than otherwise re-
quired under the common law.57 First, plaintiffs must prove that a de-
fendant “contributed to” the handling of the waste in question.58 Sec-
ond, under the “may present an imminent and substantial harm” stan-
dard, plaintiffs must establish the remaining three causational ele-
ments: (1) the endangerment is “imminent,”59 (2) the level of risk is 
sufficient to justify court action,60 and (3) the potential degree of harm 
is “substantial.”61 Rarely, when the waste is more common, a causation 
question arises as to whether the waste causing the potential harm is 
the same waste the defendant actually handled, or whether it is just the 
same type.62 
B. Section 7002’s Language Interpreted Broadly Based on Legislative History 
1. The Phrase “Contribute To” Expands the Potential Sphere of Liable 
Defendants 
 Through the use of the phrase “contribute to,” Congress intended 
to broaden the traditionally narrow sphere of responsible defendants 
in the area of solid waste disposal.63 As congressional reports show, 
common law notions of proximate cause are not to be considered when 
imposing liability on defendants who may only have had a relatively 
small role in the improper waste disposal.64 Specifically, this report 
                                                                                                                      
55 See id. 
56 See id. 
57 See RCRA, § 7002, 42 U.S.C. 6972(a)(1)(B) (2006); S. Rep. No. 98–294, at 59. 
58 RCRA, § 7002, 42 U.S.C. 6972(a)(1)(B). 
59 See Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1996). 
60 See Dague v. City of Burlington, 935 F.2d 1343, 1356 (2d Cir. 1991). 
61 See Interfaith Cmty. Org. v. Honeywell Int’l, 399 F.3d 248, 259 (3d Cir. 2005). It may 
be argued that timing of harm, degree of risk, and level of harm are not actually causation 
questions, but fall into the category of harm. However, these cases are about stopping po-
tential harm, not analyzing the effects of a harm that has already taken place. Thus, the 
“harm” that must be proven consists of predictions based on scientific research. Since the 
harm that must be proven is actually scientific research projecting the likely outcome of 
such harm, it is better to think of these elements as questions of potential causation. See S. 
Rep. No. 98–284, at 59 (1983). 
62 See generally Att’y Gen. of Okla. v. Tyson Foods Inc., 565 F.3d 769 (10th Cir. 2009). 
63 See S. Rep. No. 96–172, at 5 (1980). 
64 See id. 
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states that “terms and concepts, such as persons ‘contributing to’ the 
handling of the waste are to be construed more liberally than its com-
mon law counterpart.”65 Thus, while the automobile repairman who 
overflowed the gas and had a role in the eventual explosion escapes 
liability under strict proximate cause analysis, defendants who merely 
transport or generate the solid waste, even if not directly responsible 
for its improper disposal, are to be held liable under section 7002.66 
 Congress also intended for the “contribute to” requirement to in-
crease the amount of time a court can look back to determine the 
“cause” of a specific harm.67 When Congress first authored section 
7003, the EPA had the authority to sue anyone contributing to the han-
dling of potentially harmful waste.68 When passed, the statute was un-
clear regarding whether the EPA had the authority to sue past con-
tributors to the waste, or whether it was restricted to imposing liability 
on the current waste handler.69 In order to clarify some initial court 
decisions, Congress amended the statute to give the EPA or citizens the 
right to sue any past or present handler of waste.70 This exemplifies, 
again, how Congress changed the rules of proximate cause to ensure 
more defendants could be held liable under section 7002 than under 
the common law.71 
 Courts have adhered to Congress’s intention regarding the broad 
reach of the “contribute to” element.72 Courts have used this language 
to impose liability amongst actors along the entire chain of waste pro-
duction such as generators, transporters, disposers, etc., as well as to 
actors far back in time.73 The element simply ensures that someone po-
tentially liable under section 7002 actually had “a share in any act or 
effect” in the production of the waste, and was not simply an innocent 
bystander in the process.74 
 For example, in United States v. Aceto Agricultural Chemical Corp., the 
court held that the defendant Aceto Corporation contributed to the 
disposal of pesticides, even though the Aidex Corporation had actually 
                                                                                                                      
65 Id. 
66 See Palmetto Fire Ins. Co. v. Clark Garage Co., 6 La. App. 420, 420 (La. Ct. App. 
1927); S. Rep. No. 96–172, at 5. 
67 See H.R. Rep. No. 98–1133, at 119 (1984) (Conf. Rep.). 
68 See Peterson, supra note 42, at 337. 
69 See id. 
70 See H.R. Rep. No. 98–1133, at 119. 
71 See id. 
72 See United States v. Aceto Agric. Chem. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1384 (8th Cir. 1989). 
73 See Parker v. Scrap Metal Processors, Inc., 386 F.3d 993, 1015 (11th Cir. 2004); Cox v. 
City of Dallas, 256 F.3d 281, 298 (5th Cir. 2001); Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1383. 
74 See Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1384. 
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disposed of the pesticides.75 The court noted that Aceto contracted 
with Aidex to formulate their pesticides, retained ownership of the pes-
ticides throughout the process, and supplied the specifications for the 
process to Aidex.76 These factors made it clear that Aceto had contrib-
uted to the disposal of the hazardous waste.77 Similarly, a court found 
the city of Dallas contributed to illegal dumping of waste at a city dump, 
even though the company Dallas Demolition actually disposed of the 
waste.78 The court reasoned that the city had also contributed to the 
unlawful disposal because it contracted with Dallas Demolition while 
knowing the illegal dumping was taking place.79 Both cases refer to the 
defendant’s contribution to the handling of the waste itself, not to the 
defendant’s contribution to the alleged harm.80 
 While courts have construed the “contribute to” element broadly, 
courts will not hold defendants liable who can prove their role had no 
impact on the handling of the waste.81 In California Department of Toxic 
Substances Control v. Interstate Non-Ferrous Corp., the court refused to im-
pose liability on a past waste handler because no evidence was intro-
duced to establish that this specific defendant actually had any effect in 
the handling of the waste.82 
2. The “May Present a Substantial and Imminent Harm” Language 
Includes Three Additional Causation Elements 
a. Timing of Harm 
 In addition to the “contribute to” element, the phrase “may pre-
sent a substantial and imminent harm” presents three additional causa-
tion questions that all have a relaxed proximate cause standard.83 First, 
section 7002 relaxes how close in time a potential harm must occur to 
be considered “imminent.”84 The Supreme Court made it clear that 
section 7002 requires an ongoing threat of harm, and does not apply to 
                                                                                                                      
75 Id. at 1383. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 See Cox, 256 F.3d at 296–97. 
79 See id. 
80 See id. at 296; Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1383. 
81 See Cal. Dep’t of Toxic Substances Control v. Interstate Non-Ferrous Corp., 298 F. 
Supp. 2d 930, 979 (E.D. Cal. 2003). 
82 Id. 
83 RCRA, § 7002, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) (2006); see Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. 
Co. v. Grant, 505 F.3d 1013, 1020–21 (10th Cir. 2007). 
84 RCRA, § 7002, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B); see Dague v. City of Burlington, 935 F.2d 
1343, 1355–56 (2d Cir. 1991). 
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past threats that no longer exist.85 However, only a threat of harm must 
be imminent, not an actual harm itself.86 Indeed, an imminent hazard 
may be declared “at any point in a chain of events which may ultimately 
result in harm to the public,”87 and courts have made clear that section 
7002 is not reserved only for emergency situations.88 
 For instance, in United States v. Waste Industries, Inc., the court re-
jected the defendant’s claim that section 7002 applies only to emer-
gency situations due to the language of the section requiring that the 
event be probable.89 The court stated that injunctions under section 
7002 are proper when only a risk of harm exists, even though the actual 
harm might not occur until much later.90 Thus, the Fourth Circuit re-
versed the district court’s “emergency only” ruling, and held that a 
landfill that only presented an imminent risk of harm satisfied this 
element.91 
b. Risk of Harm 
 Aside from expanding the “imminence” of the harm, the “may 
present a substantial and imminent harm” element also alters the tradi-
tional amount of risk that plaintiffs must establish in order to prevail at 
both the preliminary injunction stage and at trial.92 With section 7002, 
Congress changed what plaintiffs must demonstrate to receive a pre-
liminary injunction by replacing the “irreparable harm standard” of the 
common law with a “risk of harm” standard.93 This would facilitate 
more injunctions for the benefit of the environment.94 While the ir-
reparable harm standard may be thought of as protecting defendants 
from the troubles of complying with an unnecessary injunction, the risk 
of harm standard showcases a choice to protect the environment from 
the unnecessary harm caused by a lack of hard science.95 
 In addition to establishing a more relaxed standard for receiving an 
injunction, section 7002 also lowers the level of risk that plaintiffs must 
                                                                                                                      
85 See Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1996). 
86 See Dague, 935 F.2d at 1356. 
87 Id. at 1355–56. 
88 Id. 
89 See United States v. Waste Indus., Inc., 734 F.2d 159, 165 (4th Cir. 1984). 
90 See id. 
91 Id. at 168. 
92 RCRA, § 7002, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B); see Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. 
Grant, 505 F.3d 1013, 1020–21 (10th Cir. 2007); United States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204, 211 
(3d Cir. 1982). 
93 See Price, 688 F.2d at 211. 
94 See id. 
95 See id. 
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demonstrate in order to prevail at trial.96 The “operative word . . . 
‘may’,” when combined with the word “endangerment,” as both words 
are probable in nature, clearly demonstrates the low level of risk re-
quired by section 7002.97 Courts have noted that this “expansive lan-
guage” proves that section 7002 does not require proof of actual harm.98 
Indeed, wastes have been found to satisfy this causation element when 
there may be “any risk” of harm.99 Furthermore, Congress intended that 
if an error is to be made regarding this element of causation, it should 
be made as to protect human health and the environment.100 
c. Degree of Harm 
 Aside from requiring a risk of the harm, section 7002 also requires 
that the degree of harm be “substantial.”101 The statute does not define 
“substantial,” but courts have consistently held that harm is substantial if 
it is “serious.”102 Further, harm is “serious” if there is reasonable concern 
that a person or the environment may be harmed by the waste in ques-
tion.103 This element does not require that the harm be quantified in 
order to be substantial.104 For example, the court in Interfaith Community 
Organization v. Honeywell International—addressing a possible contamina-
tion of hexavalent chromium—found that the defendant’s contention 
that it was complying with state standards did not imply that the harm 
was insubstantial.105 
III. Relaxed Causation Standards Opened the Door for 
“Imperfect Science” to Satisfy Proof of Causation 
 These relaxed causation standards have also changed the level of 
scientific proof required to win a section 7002 case because they broad-
en the types of proof that can establish harm.106 Specifically, section 
7002 allows imperfect, or “soft,” science to serve as the basis of impos-
ing liability.107 Congress endorsed a standard of causation that is less 
                                                                                                                      
96 See Burlington, 505 F.3d at 1020–21. 
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than scientific certainty by stating that “risk may be ‘assessed from sus-
pected, but not completely substantiated, relationships between facts, 
from trends among facts, from theoretical projections, from imperfect 
data, or from probative preliminary data not yet certifiable as ‘fact.’”108 
While Congress was well aware of the tension between imposing liability 
on defendants without sufficient proof, and allowing the environment 
to suffer due to a lack of science, Congress firmly came down on the 
side of the environment.109 
 The “imperfect data” language quoted above is from Ethyl Corp. v. 
EPA, and Congress’s endorsement of this language sheds additional 
light on how Congress thought courts should treat issues of causation 
and lack of scientific certainty.110 Ethyl Corp. held that the Administrator 
of the EPA could promulgate rules limiting the amount of lead in gaso-
line, even though no hard proof existed establishing that auto emis-
sions were the primary cause of human exposure to lead.111 The court 
noted that it is virtually impossible to isolate one source of lead and de-
termine its effect on the body,112 and the lead industry argued that the 
lack of hard science linking human lead levels directly with auto emis-
sions prevented EPA from enacting a rule limiting lead additives in 
gasoline.113 However, the court rejected that argument, noting that 
Congress understood these problems of proof when it used an “endan-
germent” standard, and decided that the environment or human 
health should not suffer due to a lack of scientific certainty.114 The “soft 
science” argument that humans derive some of their lead content from 
ambient air, and that auto emissions are the primary cause of lead in 
the ambient air, satisfied the endangerment standard.115 The court 
noted that when Congress authors a precautionary statute, courts will 
not require a “rigorous step-by-step proof of cause and effect.”116 Sec-
tion 7002 also employs an endangerment standard, and thus the les-
sons from Ethyl Corp. are still very relevant to RCRA’s citizen suit.117 
                                                                                                                      
108 Id. 
109 Id. “The primary intent of the provision is to protect human health and the envi-
ronment.” Id. 
110 See 541 F.2d 1, 28 (D.C. Cir. 1976); S. Rep. No. 98–284, at 59. 
111 See Ethyl Corp., 541 F.2d at 7–8 (stating that humans have multiple sources of expo-
sure to lead). 
112 Id. at 9. 
113 Id. at 12. 
114 See id. at 25–26. 
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 EPA has adhered to Congress’s intentions and declared that im-
perfect science can be used to prove that waste may present an endan-
germent.118 In a 1997 document explaining the phrase “imminent and 
substantial endangerment,” EPA lists several factors to be assessed when 
determining the connection between the waste and harm.119 For in-
stance: (1) “the existence of a connection between the solid or hazard-
ous waste and air, soil, groundwater, or surface water”; (2) “the path-
way(s) of exposure from the hazardous or solid waste to the receptor 
population”; and (3) “the sensitivity of the receptor population.”120 
Each of these factors demonstrates that an exact science linking the 
waste to the alleged harms will often not exist.121 Therefore, common 
sense indicators can be used to assess the level of risk involved.122 
 Courts have also relied on “pathways of exposure” to satisfy the cau-
sation element when absolute scientific proof is lacking.123 In Interfaith 
Community Organization v. Honeywell International, the defendant’s chro-
mium production site, which was possibly leaking hexavalent chromium 
into the Hackensack River, was held to present an endangerment in part 
because of the pathways of exposure between the waste and harm.124 
Specifically, holes in the company’s plastic liner allowed the chromium 
to seep into and contaminate the groundwater.125 This kind of proof 
satisfied requirements of section 7002 because its primary goal is to min-
imize future harm to the environment even without absolute scientific 
proof.126 
 Leister v. Black & Decker presents an example of a court correctly 
rejecting a section 7002 claim when plaintiffs lack proof of any risk that 
the waste may present an endangerment to the environment or 
health.127 The court held that the plaintiffs could not show a risk of 
harm from the industry defendant’s solid waste because the plaintiffs 
had a filtration system for their water which eliminated the risk.128 The 
court did not hold plaintiffs to a standard of actual harm, but rather, 
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consistent with the language of section 7002, held that plaintiffs were 
not entitled to relief because not even a risk of harm existed.129 
IV. The New Causation Question—Linking Ubiquitous and 
Natural Wastes to Specific Defendants 
 For most of section 7002’s history, proving the above elements— 
contribution to the handling of solid waste, and that this type of waste 
may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to the envi-
ronment—satisfied the question of causation.130 It was rare for courts to 
require plaintiffs to prove a link between the waste causing harm and 
the waste handled by a specific defendant on his property, because the 
uncommon and specific materials usually at issue under this section 
could not have come from anywhere else.131 
 For example, when the plaintiffs in United States v. Aceto Agricultural 
Chemical Corp. alleged that the pesticides leaking from the defendant’s 
property were contaminating their adjacent property, it was obvious the 
pesticides in the contaminated area were the same as the pesticides 
handled by the defendant.132 In the case of Aurora National Bank v. Tri 
Star Marketing, Inc., the petroleum and kerosene handled by the defen-
dants at their gas station were obviously the same petroleum and kero-
sene contaminating the same property that the plaintiffs now owned.133 
These cases illustrate that most of the wastes litigated under section 
7002 just could not have come from anywhere else.134 
 However, when plaintiffs use section 7002 to sue over a more 
common and ubiquitous solid waste, an additional causation question 
arises: is the waste that is harming the environment actually the same 
waste that was handled by the defendants on site, or has the waste 
harming the environment come from other industries, the environ-
ment, or a combination?135 
 At least one EPA action shows that EPA believes RCRA can impose 
liability in the realm of ubiquitous wastes.136 In 2006, EPA filed a com-
plaint under section 7003 against Seaboard Foods because their con-
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130 See RCRA, § 7002, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) (2006); supra Part III. 
131 See generally ABB Indus. Sys., Inc. v. Prime Tech., Inc., 120 F.3d 351 (2d Cir. 1997) 
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centrated animal feeding operations (CAFOs) were presenting an im-
minent threat to the environment by increasing the amount of nitrate 
and ammonia in ground water, a naturally occurring byproduct of CA-
FOs.137 EPA believed that Seaboard Foods was liable under section 7003 
even though it can be very difficult to prove concretely that a naturally 
occurring and ubiquitous waste is coming from a specific defendant 
rather than other sources.138 A court never ruled on the merits of this 
case.139 However, one recent case serves as a helpful illustration of the 
way courts are starting to deal with this issue.140 
A. Oklahoma v. Tyson Foods, Inc. Illustrates RCRA’s New Causation 
Question 
 In 2005, the State of Oklahoma filed a complaint against several 
poultry processors (Tyson Foods) under section 7002 seeking a pre-
liminary injunction to halt the application of “poultry litter” fertilizer141 
on the ground within the Illinois River Watershed (IRW).142 The State 
alleged that the poultry processors were responsible for applying large 
quantities of poultry waste on the land within the IRW, which adversely 
affects the water quality of the IRW, as well as the humans who swim in 
it.143 Oklahoma’s motion for preliminary injunction was denied on cau-
sation grounds.144 The court found that Oklahoma failed to establish 
that the bacteria found in the Illinois River was actually the same bacte-
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138 See id.; Steilacoom Lake Improvement Club, Inc. v. Washington, 138 F. App’x. 929, 
933 (9th Cir. 2005). 
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142 See id. at 773. 
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animals. See id. For purposes of this Note, all bacteria and nutrients contained in poultry 
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144 Although the injunction could have been decided on a number of grounds, it was ex-
pressly denied due to a lack of specific causation. See Oklahoma ex. rel. Edmondson v. Tyson 
Foods, Inc., No. 05-CV-329-GKF-SAJ, 2008 WL 4453098, at *4 (N.D. Okla. Sept. 29, 2008). 
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ria from the poultry litter handled by the defendants.145 The denial of 
preliminary injunction was confirmed in an interlocutory appeal.146 
The case eventually moved on to trial and was decided on different 
grounds—specifically that poultry litter is not solid waste as defined 
under RCRA.147 Nonetheless, the denial of a preliminary injunction in 
Tyson Foods is a helpful illustration of the facts that lead to a new causa-
tion question for ubiquitous wastes under RCRA. This new causation 
question—how to link a ubitquitous waste to a specific defendant—is 
likely to repeat itself in the future.148 From this point forward, this Note 
will refer to linking a ubiquitous waste to a specific defendant as “Ty-
son’s causation question.” 
 Before making its determination on the preliminary injunction, 
the court excluded two expert witnesses who attempted to establish a 
foolproof “link” between poultry litter bacteria and Illinois River bacte-
ria.149 Specifically, two scientists compared the DNA of bacteria in the 
Illinois River and bacteria in poultry litter, and argued that it was a 
match.150 For this court, the decision to exclude evidence of the DNA 
link between poultry litter bacteria and the Illinois River bacteria effec-
tively decides the causation question, because, without this evidence, no 
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146 See Tyson Foods, 565 F.3d at 774. 
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ubiquitous and naturally occurring “waste” to its original source. See 138 F. App’x at 931–
32; Tyson Foods, 2008 WL 4453098, at *4. 
149 See Tyson Foods, 2008 WL 4453098, at *3. The court applied the Daubert test to ex-
clude the testimony of Dr. Olsen and Dr. Harwood. The court determined that this scien-
tific research was excluded under Daubert because it had not been peer reviewed. Id. 
150 See Att’y Gen. of Okla. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 565 F.3d 769 (10th Cir. 2009); Tyson 
Foods, 2008 WL 4453098, at *3. 
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hard scientific proof connected the IRW bacteria and bacteria from the 
defendant’s property.151 
 The court did, however, admit evidence that suggested a possible 
connection between poultry litter and the Illinois River bacteria.152 
Specifically, evidence showed that poultry producers apply poultry litter 
directly to the land, and this portion of the IRW has karstic geology— 
fractured and partially dissolved, with fissures, sinkholes, underground 
streams, and caverns.153 The karstic geology of the surrounding land is 
related to legitimate risk factors such as clear pathways of exposure and 
the sensitivity of the receiving population.154 Moreover, Oklahoma pre-
sented the fact that state and federal authorities, and many independ-
ent organizations, all believed that bacteria from poultry litter was en-
tering the Illinois River.155 
 In sum, Oklahoma did not possess any concrete scientific proof 
that the bacteria in the Illinois River was actually the same bacteria that 
originated at the poultry processor’s property, but rather only pre-
sented “soft” scientific theories and projections.156 The court reasoned 
from prior case law that there must be “some level of causation between 
the contamination and a party to be held liable.”157 Moreover, “it is not 
enough [to contribute] to solid waste that was handled” because the 
“‘contribution’ must be causally connected to the possibility of an ‘im-
minent and substantial endangerment.’”158 A more difficult question, 
however, is what kinds of proof of this connection are sufficient to im-
pose liability under section 7002?159 
V. Oklahoma v. Tyson Foods, Inc.’s Causation Question Should 
Have a Lower Standard of Proof Than the Common Law 
 When linking a ubiquitous waste to a specific defendant (“Tyson’s 
causation question”), this new causation question should be considered 
using the same low proximate cause standard used throughout the rest 
of the statute.160 This analysis is supported by courts’ interpretation of 
                                                                                                                      
151 See Tyson Foods, 565 F.3d at 769; Tyson Foods, 2008 WL 4453098, at *3. 
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the statute, based on the legislative intent behind section 7002, and by 
the EPA’s current position on this specific question.161 
A. Section 7002’s Expansion of the Phrase “Contribute To” Should Also  
Guide Tyson’s New Causation Question 
 Tyson’s causation question should be decided by a relaxed proxi-
mate cause standard in order to be consistent with other similarly re-
laxed standards of proximate cause used in section 7002.162 The causa-
tional question surrounding whether a defendant “contributed to” the 
handling of the waste is more expansive than its common law counter-
part.163 The “contribute to” element expanded the chain of actors that 
may be reached under proximate cause, both in terms of participation 
in the process and in the time period considered.164 Since Congress 
wanted to broaden the scope of liable defendants, they clearly chose 
the environment over the risks created by low causation standards.165 
Thus, for Tyson’s causation question, courts should infer that Congress 
did not want to prevent lawsuits from going forward for a lack of con-
crete scientific proof.166 
 It is settled that the “contribute to” element requires “some causal 
connection between the defendant’s action and the alleged harm.”167 
Some defendants encourage, and the court in Tyson Foods agreed, that 
“contribute to” requires actual, and a higher degree of, proof of causa-
tion between a specific waste and a specific defendant.168 However, 
while the “contribute to” element may indicate the need for a causal 
relationship, it should not require a level of proof of causation higher 
than that employed by the rest of the statute.169 This is true because 
while “contribute to” may suggest a causal relationship between the de-
fendant and the harm, that was not the true intention of the lan-
guage.170 The main reason for the inclusion of the “contribute to” ele-
ment was to broaden the scope of actors who can be held liable.171 The 
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same language that expands a defendant’s liability in contributing to 
the waste should not also restrict a defendant’s liability by increasing 
the level of proof needed to establish the causal link between harm and 
specific defendants required in another area.172 
B. The Remaining Causation Elements Also Demonstrate that Section 7002 is 
Exclusively Governed By Relaxed Standards of Causation 
 Further evidence that Tyson’s causation question should be de-
cided by the same relaxed proximate cause standard as other parts of 
the statute is the lower level of risk needed to obtain a preliminary in-
junction.173 By switching to the “risk or harm” standard rather than “ir-
reparable harm,” Congress demonstrated its willingness to relinquish 
the traditional safeguards of the common law regarding impeding the 
actions of innocent defendants.174 Tyson’s causation question should 
also benefit from the same congressional reasoning.175 While under the 
common law “irreparable harm” was required before imposing liability 
on defendants to protect them from unwarranted lawsuits, section 7002 
deliberately weakens these safeguards in order to further the important 
cause of regulating solid wastes.176 Allowing Tyson’s causation question 
to be decided in the same fashion as the preliminary injunction stan-
dard would facilitate Congress’s goals.177 
 Also, the low level of risk that plaintiffs must prove demonstrates 
that Tyson’s causation question should be considered under a relaxed 
proximate cause standard.178 Instead of actual harm, section 7002 re-
quires defendants to alter their practices if their waste disposal presents 
any risk of harm to the environment.179 Thus, it would be contradictory 
to require concrete scientific proof to link specific defendants to ubiq-
uitous wastes, because it is not required to establish the risk of harm.180 
Tyson’s causation element should be resolved consistent with Congress’s 
choice to protect the environment over the risk of imposing liability in 
cases with no actual harm.181 
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 Additionally, the fact that section 7002 permits soft science to 
prove the above causational elements suggests that soft science should 
also be able to prove Tyson’s new causation question.182 Again, section 
7002 changes the common law standard of causation, making the de-
liberate choice to risk inaccuracy in favor of expanded liability and re-
sponsibility for defendants acting in the realm of solid and hazardous 
waste.183 This desire to allow imperfect data to satisfy causational stan-
dards can be seen in the congressional history of the statute.184 It can 
also be seen in cases where the court has not required concrete evi-
dence of causation questions.185 Allowing soft science to link ubiquitous 
wastes to specific defendants would adhere to the intentions of Con-
gress and the courts.186 
C. EPA Actions Demonstrate That it Does Not Require Actual Proof to  
Link a Ubiquitous Waste to a Specific Defendant 
 Although Congress did not directly consider Tyson’s question dur-
ing RCRA’s passage, the EPA has over time indicated that it feels ubiq-
uitous wastes need not be linked through concrete scientific proof.187 
The EPA’s 1997 document regarding section 7003 indicates that the 
EPA felt soft sciences could be used to prove questions of causation un-
der this section.188 They also have sued defendants responsible for 
ubiquitous wastes which could have come from other locations even 
when they did not have hard scientific proof of a link between the de-
fendant and the waste.189 EPA’s complaint against Seaboard Foods, 
where the amount of nitrate in groundwater could have come from 
other sources, strongly suggests that the EPA does not read into section 
7002 a requirement that ubiquitous wastes be linked to defendants 
through concrete proof.190 EPA knows the best way to address issues of 
complex causation to ensure a fair balance between imposing liability 
on responsible actors, and protecting the environment in the spirit of 
RCRA; its interpretation of section 7002 should be given deference.191 
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D. Tyson’s Reasoning on this Issue Presents an Example of an Incorrect 
Interpretation of the New Causation Question Under Section 7002 
 With this principle in mind regarding Tyson’s causation question, 
the opinion of the district court provides a useful illustration of the 
wrong way to answer the question, and the consequences that stem 
from that error.192 Throughout its opinion, the district court uses lan-
guage which reveals that it erroneously required absolute proof that 
Tyson Foods contributed to the alleged harm.193 The opinion begins by 
stating, “[t]he State has not yet met its burden of proving that bacteria 
in the waters of the IRW are caused by the application of poultry litter 
rather than by other sources.”194 A statement that accurately reflects the 
“may present” causational standard would read: “The State has not yet 
met its burden of showing that poultry litter may present an imminent 
and substantial endangerment to human health or the environ-
ment.”195 The court then concluded its opinion with: “[T]he State has 
failed to meet the applicable standard of showing that the bacteria lev-
els in the IRW can be traced to the application of poultry litter.”196 The 
most revealing word in that sentence is “traced,” since it suggests that 
the district court required dispositive scientific proof that the bacteria 
in the river came from the poultry litter.197 
 Further evidence that the district court mistakenly required the 
plaintiffs to establish concrete scientific proof is that a substantial por-
tion of the opinion is dedicated to the exclusion of two expert witnesses 
who attempted to establish this foolproof “link” between poultry litter 
bacteria and Illinois River bacteria.198 This demonstrates that the court 
incorrectly held plaintiffs to a standard of scientific certainty by declar-
ing that there was no proof that defendants “contributed to” the bacte-
ria causing the harm.199 
 Contrary to the opinion of the Tenth Circuit, the court did not use 
the correct causational standard since, if it had, it would have been obli-
gated to address the admitted evidence that suggested a possible con-
nection between poultry litter and the Illinois River bacteria.200 Never-
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theless, as the dissent notes, although two expert opinions were ex-
cluded, the court did admit evidence that poultry producers apply poul-
try litter directly to the land, that this portion of the IRW is karstic, and 
that state and federal authorities, and many independent organizations, 
all believed that bacteria from poultry litter was entering the Illinois Riv-
er.201 This is not to say that this evidence is dispositive on the issue. How-
ever, at the very least, if the court was using the correct causational stan-
dard of probability, it should have addressed this evidence and ex-
plained why it felt that this evidence did not establish that poultry litter 
may present an endangerment to human health or the environment.202 
 The other side of this argument, of course, is the charge that by 
not requiring scientific links between harms and defendants, courts will 
be imposing liability on possibly innocent defendants, and thus impos-
ing a disproportional burden of waste cleanup on them.203 Certainly 
this argument is true. By lowering standards of proximate cause and 
levels of scientific proof, it opens the door to more defendants being 
mistakenly held liable.204 On the other hand, it also opens the door for 
better environmental protection for real harms when no scientific 
proof of their causes exists.205 When deciding Tyson’s causation ques-
tion, like the other questions of causation answered by the courts under 
section 7002, a choice needs to be made between accurate liability and 
unaddressed or unproven harms.206 In addition to the broad construc-
tion of other causation questions, courts should remember the broad 
policy decisions behind the initial passage of RCRA, understanding that 
while steps have been made, RCRA’s original purpose is just as strong 
today.207 The general purpose of the act was to protect the environment 
through a statute with a low threshold of liability.208 RCRA came at a 
time when Congress was reacting to the solid and hazardous waste 
problem that it believed was reaching crisis level proportions.209 RCRA 
represented a substantial overhaul of the way the United States treats 
solid waste and a refusal to turn a blind eye to problems just because 
they are not in plain sight.210 Congress intentionally chose to reform 
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the way the country handled solid waste in response to an increasingly 
complicated, technological, and chemically filled world without guar-
antees of scientific certainty.211 Congress’s choice of the environment 
over the risk of assigning some defendants unwarranted liability is as 
relevant and important today as it was in 1976.212 
Conclusion 
 The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act presented a water-
shed moment in American waste regulation by overhauling the existing 
regulatory program and implementing one of the EPA’s most complex 
regulatory schemes.213 The Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 
1984 represented Congress’s impatience with EPA’s progress, and its 
desire that citizens play a larger role in waste regulation.214 Based on 
Congress’s clear, laudable, and even dramatic intentions, courts have 
liberally construed RCRA’s citizen suit provision, making it easier for 
environmental plaintiffs to both get into court, and win once there.215 
Specifically, standards of proximate cause under the common law— 
which had been frustrating plaintiffs in highly technical cases—were 
replaced with standards of substantive liability decidedly pro-plaintiff 
and anti-waste industry.216 
 It is easy to forget these lofty goals when we move away from the 
dangerous sounding materials at the center of incidents like Love Ca-
nal, and focus on less dangerous sounding, but equally harmful, “natu-
ral wastes.” However, focusing on the proper management of natural 
wastes may just be the next step in ridding America’s land and water 
from the harmful effects of waste disposal. Additionally, citizen suits 
may lead the way in this new area of section 7002. Using section 7002 to 
stop defendants from improperly disposing natural waste will indeed 
include new questions of science and causation, and will test the court’s 
limits as to how far “soft science” may be allowed to go in order to im-
pose liability on defendants.217 However, courts should not forget the 
United States has faced these decisions before. Congress and the courts 
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have expanded traditional defendant liability and allowed relaxed cau-
sational standards to govern in every conceivable question of causation 
yet litigated under this section.218 The causation decision regarding 
natural wastes and their link to a specific defendant should be decided 
the same way. While defendants will not be liable when no evidence is 
offered against them, the environment should not suffer because sci-
ence cannot yet establish the level of certainty required by common law 
notions of causation.219 
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